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ALBANIA - JUGOSLAVIA

1. Problem

a. To prevent the take-over of Albania by the Jugoslavs or the partition of Albania by the Greeks and the Jugoslavs.

b. If conditions permit, to free Albania from Cominform control and to substitute a pro-West government without risking a retaliation Cominform attack on Jugoslavia.

2. Fasts bearing on the problem

- a. The control over Albania by the Cominform regime is becoming increasingly precarious.
 - (1) Popular dissatisfaction is widespread >
 - (2) Economic conditions are deteriorating rapidly.
 - (3) Open revolt appears to have flaired in isolated areas.
 - (h) The Cominform States are cut off from land access to
 Albania by the defection of Jugoslavia. Hence the repressive psychological effect of the proximity of the Red Army is considerably less than in other Cominform states.
 - b. Jugoslavia is now actively preparing for the take-over of Albania
 - (1) A Jugoslav-sponsored Albanian liberation committee has been set up in Jugoslavia near the Albanian border.

(2) Approximately 100 Jugoslav-sponsored resistance organizate
are now actively at work in Albania.

| CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | CLASSIFICATION | (1)

(3) It is believed that 2000 to 4000 Albanians dre now DWW

receiving para-military training in Jugeslavia AUTHORITY OR

DEGLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY EENTRAL INTELLIBENCE AGENCY SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES BISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007

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
- (h) Yugoslavia has air-dropped at least one leaflet over Albania which subpressthe populace to active resistance to the Albanian regime.
- c. Yugoslavia is now openly known to be receiving military and economic aid from the United States, and it is already rumored that a secret agreement has been reached between the United States and Yugoslavia in which Yugoslavia has been given a free hand to take over Albenia and to substitute a Jugoslav-sponsored government.
- d. Limited indications are that an agreement between Yugoslavia and Greece is at least contemplated, which would provide for the partition of Albania between these two countries. Regardless of this possibility, however, any successes on the part of Yugoslavia in the direction of overthrowing the Albanian regime would provoke increased Greek activities in Albania and, if successful, would result in partition.
- •. The Albanian people, thoroughly opposed to the present regime, would prefer Western assistance in overthrowing the regime to assistance from either Yugoslavia or Greece.
- f. Current American operations have not yet been sufficiently successful to bring about the organization of an united resistance organization. By the end of the summer, however, it may be that current activities will have succeeded in establishing a firm resistance core.

3. Conclusions

a. Yugoslavia is not sufficiently perturbed by the possibility of provoking a Russian attack to be dissuaded from active operations, both overt and covert, against Albania.

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- b. If the Cominform does not attack Yugoslavia in the next year, it is probable that, without U. S. intercession, the combination of Yugoslav activities in Albania, plus the deteriorating economic situation, will result in the overthrow of the present regime and either (1) its replacement by a Yugoslav-sponsored regime, or (2) the partition of Albania.
- e. It is probable that in this eventuality, the Cominform would not intervene unless it had been decided to liquidate the Tito regime, regardless of whether or not Albania was threatened.
- d. The overthrow of the Albanian regime by Yugoslavia would be generally regarded in Europe as the result of a deal by which Yugoslavia had been given a free hand in eliminating the Cominform regime in Albania with U. S.-supplied military equipment. Such a reaction would have very harmful repercussions among resistance groups in other Eastern European countries, where it would be interpreted as a sell-out on the part of the United States.
- e. The eliminating of the present regime in Albania and its replacement with a non-communist regime would greatly aid in the activation of widespread resistance in other satellites and in the Soviet Union, as it would be proof that it is possible for an underground resistance group to throw off successfully a communist regime.
- f. It is impossible to negotiate an agreement (which would be kept) with the Yugoslavs providing for cessation of their operations in Albania, unless sufficient pressure could be brought to bear to make it impossible for the Yugoslav regime not to accede.
 - g. Because of the pro-Western sympathies of the rank-and-file



Albanians, it is believed possible for the United States to organize successfully a revolt in Albania with considerably fewer men from abroad than would be necessary for a corresponding Yugoslav effort. It is believed that under proper circumstances, a successful revolt could be initiated by the U.S. with a force introduced from abroad of only 1000 to 2000 men.

h. A holding and training operation for 1000 to 2000 Albanians can be established in Germany under the cover of guard companies at a very small cost in U. S. supervisory personnel and money.

Recommendations:

- a. The U. S. current operations designed to establish a resistance F. S. ANDROZ.

 cere in Albania will be expanded in the manner least provocative to the Albanians or the Yugoslavs.
- b. The Yugoslav government will be advised that (1) the U. S. is aware of the Yugoslav activities; (2) that such activities are not regarded favorably by the United States; (3) that, if continued, the U. S. position on and to Yugoslavia will be re-examined and possibly cut-off; and (4) that if the Yugoslavi continue operations into Albania, the United States is prepared to undertake even heavier operations designed to prevent the domination of Albania by Yugoslavia.
- c. The capabilities of the United Stateswill be immediately expanded by increasing the present Albanian guard units in Germany to 1000 men.

 These men will receive paramilitary training to make them capable of spear-heading future guerrilla operations.
 - d. Weapons sufficient to arm 10,000 men will be stockpiled in the



Mediterranean and clandestine air and sea delivery capacity will be expanded to a level sufficient to support successful revolution.

e. The cooperation of the British government will be sought on this plan.